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Aid, and celebrity philanthropy in particular, is often criticized as if such help was 
always a simple matter of it defending, or governing, those structures of power 
and order which produce the need for philanthropy in the first place (Eikenberry 
2006; Kapoor 2013). 
 
This argument should not be downplayed; however it might not be the only line to 
the story. Criticism of celebrity philanthropy might equally stem from a desire for 
tidiness and order in the world that does not acknowledge the complexities of the 
situation, of human motivation, of the difficulties of virtue, or of unintended 
effects, and itself does little to fix the situation. Indeed demands for order and for 
divisions into good and evil may also lead to significant problems in dealing with 
the difficulty, magnitude and ‘horror’ of the troubles facing the world. 
 
This chapter explores ‘incoherence’ as a response which, if stayed with, has the 
potential to produce an opening which may allow us to deal with overwhelming 
mess, chaos, divergence and despair, and to build empathy without foreclosing 
those possibilities into premature order, certainty or condemnation. The term 
‘incoherence’ is used to refer to disorder of speech, disorder of argument, and 
disorder of intent and results, that is, to a general lack of congruence and 
coherence. The argument proceeds by looking at the relationships between help, 
exchange and empathy, moving into a brief history of ‘help’ (primarily in the UK) 
and finally exploring an interview with Angelina Jolie – film star, Goodwill 
Ambassador for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
and Special Envoy to the current High Commissioner of the UNHCR. I argue that 
incoherencies are inevitable and often useful if not dismissed, and emulation of 
celebrity may be preferable to attempted compulsion or control. 
 
Help, exchange and empathy 
 
Help always involves a potential inequity of exchange, an incoherence which can 
produce tensions. When the helper helps, the suffering helped receives and may 
never be able to make equal return. This is the prime dynamic of ‘charity’, where 
the giving directly invokes deference, praise, status, or a sense of virtue received 
by the giver, in exchange for their charitable gift. As the well known 
anthropological theory of the ‘gift’ implies, such inequality contributes to 
maintaining power and status differentials while simultaneously allowing the 
forging of bonds (Cheal 1988; Mauss 1969). Inequality also disrupts 
communication, as the receiver can no longer completely tell their truth without 
risking loss of the exchange and is likely to resent, or attempt to manipulate, the 
giver. 
 
Not all forms of gifting are the same and, as an initial proposal, we may be able to 
distinguish the following types of help/exchange: 
‘kindness’, gifts of help without ties; 
‘charity’, usually, but not always, semi-random gifts of help which imply or 
demand recognition of status differential by the helped. Charity builds 
up both separation and bonds; 
‘meritorious charity’, the main official function of charity is spiritual benefit 
to the giver; 
‘charity of compulsion’, in which people are restrained or forced to labour 
for charity – the obligation expected from charity is violent and 
formalized; 
‘philanthropy’, organized ‘kindness’ or ‘charity’ usually involving visible or 
public gifts of money to an organization which raises, publicizes, 
administers and allocates the funds. Any help received can be 
distanced from the givers; 
‘demand obligation’, in which the helped have a socially recognized ability 
to demand recognition from those with more; and 
‘impersonal welfare’, in which people have a recognized right to certain 
types of aid, usually from an impersonal source such as the State. 
 
Some of this help may primarily be aimed at ‘social control’ and some at 
maintaining ‘community’. However, maintaining community almost always 
involves some attempt to maintain order and control, and attempts at social 
control are often aimed at maintaining an ideal of community; hence an 
ambiguity, or incoherence, in the functions and consequences of help is always 
possible. Incoherence is further emphasized, as we cannot completely predict the 
consequences of all acts of help, and so what is intended to help community or to 
maintain control may have unintended, disorganizing or beneficial effects which 
differ with a person’s social position. This lack of precise control is a feature of all 
acts in complex interactive systems, and is magnified by the possibility of human 
reflection upon the consequences of acts and the acts of others (Prigogine 1996; 
Soros 2011). Similarly, demand obligation or impersonal welfare lowers the status 
differential built into unequal exchange, diminishes obligation, and allows the 
possibility that the receiver can criticize the giver and their gifts. However it can 
also demotivate the givers. The givers may start to feel put upon as relationships 
become onerous or tenuous, and there is little reward or acknowledgement. We 
cannot make a simple division of all acts of help into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ so as to 
salve our conscience, or the consciousness of our privilege. 
 
As well as involving exchange, help also involves a degree of empathy or fellow 
feeling; a feeling that something should be done to help. Humans generally seem 
to be more compassionate towards those they know, identify with, or classify 
themselves as similar to (Berreby 2006; Marshall 2006). While empathy is a 
‘natural’ feature of human life, it has to be built, as do other human capabilities 
like language. Empathy towards people outside a person’s immediate 
acquaintance, especially towards those a person may have reason to dismiss or 
condemn, is not guaranteed. What is classified as like ‘us’ can be extended by 
membership of empires, religions, appearances of intimacy, or making other 
people seem to have similar features to us and be part of our wider group. 
Similarities appear weaker the more distant, opposed or inferior the other groups 
and cultures are classified as being (Turner et al. 1987). With ‘foreign aid’, as 
there are few personal relationships, empathy has to become almost impersonal. 
This sets up another incoherence. Empathy, in being extended where there are few 
personal contacts, can override the significant differences (which would make the 
person not one of us) through fictional similarity, and in so doing almost 
guarantee misunderstanding and lack of precision in the help provided. Again, 
while impersonal welfare makes help more equitable (and less prone to ‘charity 
begins at home’) it further diminishes the status accrued from putting those being 
helped into debt or obligation, so rendering the impulse less rewarding and less 
easy to motivate. 
 
In the information society people are also continually asked to be compassionate 
towards people they don’t know and don’t identify with, empathy is stretched and 
resistances arise (Höijer 2004). What is known as ‘compassion fatigue’ may 
prevail when the scale of the problems begin to dawn upon us (‘no matter what we 
do it will never end’), there is little self-identification between the sources of 
charity and those who receive the charity, and little local payoff for giving. 
 
One solution for this problem may be emulation. Societies often have exemplars 
and ‘culture heroes’ whose (often fictionalized) lives show people how to live: 
Kings and Queens, founders of Empire, heroes of the Republic, revolutionaries, 
founding fathers, soldiers, saints, composers, poets, and so on (Cubitt and Warren 
2000). One way of building empathy or benevolence and compassion, especially 
over classificatory distance, is by putting forward exemplars of such acts, so that 
people may come to emulate them in a socially reinforced manner. This requires 
‘celebrity’; namely that the exemplars be publicized, well known and admired. 
Emulation is a major feature in all help, including celebrity philanthropy. 
 
In summary, the connection between help, gifting and obligation makes help 
problematic. Receiving a gift implies obligation, inferiority or dependence on the 
part of the receiver and hence can undermine accurate communication, and set up 
inequalities and the preservation of what maintains the inequality. Conflict can 
arise between help as maintaining order and help as maintaining community, or 
between serving one’s self and serving community. Building empathy can delete 
the recognition of important differences, and while impersonal giving can be 
freeing for the recipient, it can also delete motivation from the giver, and new 
motivation, such as emulation, is needed. These incoherencies shape the 
paradoxical dynamics of helping, and are common throughout history, with 
motivation being built from spiritual reward, compulsion, gaining a sense of 
control, or through emulation. 
 
A short history of incoherent help 
 
Donna Andrew (1989) suggests that ‘pre-modern’ charity in Britain was primarily 
meritorious, focusing on the religious benefits to the donor more than on the help 
given to the recipient. Giving was an act of devotion that compensated for sin and 
demonstrated faith (Andrew 1989: 197). It was promoted ‘that thereby they might 
render the deity propitious to them’, with the poor praying for their benefactors in 
return (Burn 1764: 3). Tales of saints, and the strength of their relics, acted as 
exemplars of Christian charity and its rewards. Charity was also given from the 
tithes compulsorily paid to the local Bishop (Burn 1764: 2-5). Such charity was 
not separated from obligation and deference, and might be considered self-
oriented as it benefited the giver socially and spiritually. While it may have 
produced communal bonds, it did not produce the fixed communal order that the 
dominant classes desired, with charity supposedly being abused by wandering 
vagabonds (Burn 1764: 5). 
 
Over time, meritorious charity both clashed and combined with acts of Parliament 
which attempted to make local authorities responsible for their indigent, punish 
wandering beggars, scholars or folk healers, and set up workhouses, with the 
apparent intention of making being unable to support oneself or one’s family as 
unpleasant and punitive as possible; empathy was to be broken. A vagrant would 
be stripped and publicly whipped ‘till his body be bloody’ (Burn 1764: 27). 
Meritorious charity given to such people could result in heavy fines (Burn 1764: 
17-20, 57), making kindness guilty and covert and threatening the community 
order and bonding it was supposed to defend (see Lord Hale in Burn 1764: 137). 
Vagabonds could also be enslaved and, from Charles II onwards, enslaved and 
transported to overseas plantations (Burn 1764: 32). Houses of correction were 
established for able-bodied poor: ‘there to be straightly kept, as well in diet as in 
work, and also punished from time to time’ (Burn 1764: 82). This charity of 
compulsion is clearly intended as social control. However, these laws also failed 
to keep people bound to their community, as self-sufficiency was broken, there 
was little work available and the local ‘poor taxes’ resented or misappropriated – 
there was an incentive to expel the poor. People continued to flood into the cities 
from the country, providing the cheap semi-starving labour that helped capitalism 
begin (Marx 1954: 671–701). The larger the city the less obvious the vagabond; 
impersonality became freedom of a sort. Charity of compulsion attempted to 
forcibly preserve social ‘order’ in the face of its ongoing failure. 
 
With a growing recognition of this failure during the eighteenth century, older 
communal forms of charity were supplemented by organized private charities 
aimed at resolving or suppressing social problems (the two actions are hard to 
distinguish). These efforts aimed at ‘reforming immorality’, changing the 
workforce into docile workers and improving the wealth of the nation. In ‘1650 
London had few if any privately organized and financed charitable institutions, by 
1800 it had dozens’ (Andrew 1989: 1). Writing in the eighteenth century, Richard 
Burn (1764: 129) states, that the ‘ancient laws’ were ‘to prevent enormities; the 
present laws are to encourage industry. Anciently, the maintenance of the poor 
was principally intended; their employment, at present, merits equally our regard’. 
 
While Michel Foucault (2003: 242–63) appears to emphasize that in France these 
concerns over the quality of national populations (‘biopolitics’) originated with 
the State, Andrew’s focus (1989) suggests these changes, in the UK, began in 
private philanthropy. Civic-minded merchants formed the ‘joint stock or 
“associated” charity’ that raised money for foundling hospitals, orphanages, and 
educational facilities, which provided work training for impoverished youth, 
‘penitent Magdalens’ and criminals (Andrew 1989: 49, 122–27). These facilities 
resembled workhouses and prisons. The philanthropies targeted wealthy donors 
through charity balls and bazaars, charity sermons and dinners, and benefits at 
theatres and operas (Andrew 1989: 80–5). Philanthropy was entangled with both 
entertainment and imposition of social order from the beginning. It intertwined 
charity with displays of wealth and generosity before other wealthy people who 
emulated each other in competition of gifting. The ‘worthiness’ of such causes 
was shown, not so much by their effects on the recipients, but by transparent 
management and accounting practices (money was not to be wasted), and by 
ensuring that the recipients were seen as ‘deserving’ rather than ‘undeserving’ of 
assistance (Andrew 1989: 83–5). Presumably the cause’s ‘worth’ also relied on it 
not upsetting those who sponsored it. This is always a problem for help; it will 
usually aim at pleasing its giver’s sense of order, which may not be the sense of 
order possessed by the helped. 
 
However, in organized philanthropy, donors do not receive personal genuflection 
from the receivers of gifts of help; the receivers may not even know who the 
donors are, other than their generalized ‘betters’. Charity becomes more 
impersonal. As an unintended and incoherent consequence, this growth in 
impersonality could have made the ability of the working class to demand help in 
hard times as a right, rather than a discipline, not be heard as completely 
unreasonable, during the struggles for what came to be called the Welfare State in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The virtuous condescension of 
the visiting donor, faced with a less connected underclass able to make demands, 
began to appear uneasy and ineffective (Siegel 2012). 
 
These philanthropic organizations were primarily devoted to local or national 
philanthropy. As Elaine Jeffreys argues in Chapter 1 of this book, celebrity came 
into internationalized philanthropy as a necessary part of its growth. Missionaries, 
such as Dr. Livingstone (1813–1873), became exemplars of help in the nineteenth 
century. This again emphasizes the paradoxical nature of help: the imperialistic 
forces which might trivialize, or even destroy ‘foreign’ self-sufficiency are also 
those that bring the issues to the fore. 
 
Celebrities provided a focus, and bridge with which to build empathy. The first 
modern, truly international, celebrity philanthropist might be Albert Schweitzer 
(1875–1965), the German theologian, missionary, doctor, philosopher and music 
theorist, who set up a hospital in Lambaréné in Africa. People such as Schweitzer 
gave up considerable wealth and success in order to help others in fairly 
dangerous conditions. They risked anger from establishment forces that 
considered the people they worked with to be mere brutes, or in need of violent 
governing, and later risked anger from those who thought they treated the locals 
patronizingly, or who thought they had no business protesting against war (Picht 
1964: 22). This was also the case with people like General Booth (1829–1912), 
who founded the Salvation Army, and who, like Friedrich Engels (1820–1895) 
(see 1972), the friend of Karl Marx, Henry Mayhew (1812–1887) (see 1968–83), 
the journalist and publisher, and the largely anonymous factory inspectors, drew 
middle class attention to the desperate lives of the British working and proletarian 
classes under nineteenth century capitalism. While these reformers may have been 
incoherent because they were largely unsympathetic to cultural values other than 
those of their own group and were often heavy handed and repressive in their 
proposals for reform, they also attempted to draw ‘injustices’ to wider attention, 
and engendered change. Their cross-cultural incoherence was an opening. 
 
Later in the nineteenth century celebrity capitalists such as Andrew Carnegie spent 
vast amounts of money on philanthropy. With Carnegie (who set out to be 
someone for other rich people to emulate via his ‘gospel of wealth’), it is 
debateable how much of that money was seen by the poor as opposed to the 
relatively well off, as he was certain that those ‘worthy of assistance, except in 
rare cases, seldom require assistance’ (1889: no page). His philanthropy 
automatically classified most of the poor as unworthy of help or of being 
questioned as to their needs. However, such wealthy donors, by the scale of their 
acts, again inculcate impersonal welfare. They cannot give personally to everyone 
they benefit, and hence cannot expect a submissive, or obligated, response to them 
personally from individual receivers of charity. They help build up the idea of 
public works and public rights to assistance, irrespective of moral approbation, 
and praise of the giver. Hence they, indirectly, undermine some of the power and 
control aspects of charity. At least Carnegie’s gifts did not directly demand 
whipping or imprisoning the poor. 
 
Max Weber suggested that a distinctive notion of early protestant capitalism was 
the breaking of human relationships. The protestant 
divided from the eternally damned remainder of humanity by a more 
impassable and in its invisibility more terrifying gulf, than separated 
the monk of the Middle Ages from the rest of the world about him, a 
gulf which penetrated all social relations with its sharp brutality. This 
consciousness of divine grace of the elect and holy was accompanied 
by an attitude toward the sin of one's neighbour, not of sympathetic 
understanding based on consciousness of one’s own weakness, but of 
hatred and contempt for him as an enemy of God bearing the signs of 
eternal damnation. (Weber 1930: 121) 
 
Poverty and misfortune became evidence of sin and association with sin risked 
salvation (Weber 1930: 163, 177; Tawney 1938: 262). Lack of spending on 
enjoyment or the support of others allowed the accumulation of capital rather than 
mandating the distribution of excess wealth amongst kin and community. This 
accumulation then became the practice by which virtue was measured. Impersonal 
philanthropy attacks (from within) this notion that the collection of capital is the 
absolute aspiration of virtuous capitalists and to be pursued at all costs. Such 
philanthropy has the potential of its incoherence to break the breakage that Weber 
points to, even while it is attempting to support the order that its wealth grows out 
of. 
 
In the twentieth century, the hard fought for welfare state was seen by left wing 
critics (who refused to acknowledge incoherence as anything other than bad) to be 
a mode of control, acting on behalf of dominant groups, turning out docile rather 
than revolutionary workers and not immediately ending inequality, or the system 
in which hardship arose (Harris 1961; Miliband 1982). With this approach, it was 
hard to defend the welfare state against neoliberals who argued that State 
representation was inherently oppressive and inefficient, and should be abandoned 
with support going to successful people, to let the ‘trickle down’ effect, hard work 
and charity remedy all. An acceptance of incoherence may have benefitted left 
wing politics. 
 
Summarizing this brief history, there appears to have been a set of overlapping 
stages in the social organization of formal acts of help in the UK at least. The first 
stage is meritorious charity, where giving primarily functions as an act of 
devotion or building relationships. This fails to stop movement of people and 
generates a charity of compulsion aimed at controlling and punishing the poor and 
curtailing empathy. Faced with the failure of compulsion, there comes a more 
private and perhaps gentler philanthropy that attempts to persuade wealthy people 
to give to organizations which then ‘manage’ supervised recipients, with the 
primary aim of quelling vice or social unrest and generating docile labourers. This 
leads into a more impersonal giving, which naturalizes impersonal welfare based 
on class demand, and mutual obligation as fellow nationals, to cushion 
misfortune. During the fight for impersonal welfare in the nineteenth century, 
international help grows, along with colonialism, as both missionary charity and 
philanthropy. International aid serves both as a mode of control and as a mode of 
extension of empathy, through exemplary figures. 
 
In the late twentieth century, under neoliberal ordering regimes, a tendency arises 
to return to charities of control and discipline: ‘work for the dole’; time periods on 
payment; constant purges of people on welfare; extensions of working life; ‘green 
armies’; and so on. The idea that poorer citizens should be able to demand help is 
no longer relevant to contemporary States, as the wealthy and the poor separate 
again and ‘downwards’ empathy is broken. Neoliberal policies are generally 
accompanied by an argument that private charity is more flexible, transparent, 
effective and reliable than government based charity as is, supposedly, all non-
government activity. It is claimed that NGOs can distribute resources more 
effectively than national governments (Zunz 2012: 286). In keeping with 
neoliberal ideology, this assumes that wealth and the powers it allocates should 
not face interference by the government, or by the people that government 
supposedly represents. 
 
We might expect private funds to take up these claims as part of a rhetorical 
strategy to justify and prolong their existence. On the other hand, NGOs may not 
act completely coherently with neoliberal theory. As Olivier Zunz (2102: 5) 
suggests, there is an ongoing political struggle over the governance of help and its 
functions. Some strands of contemporary philanthropy, say Oxfam and other ‘aid’ 
organizations, seem focused on the question of ‘what kind of philanthropy is 
valued by those receiving it?’ These strands are more prone to treat those 
benefiting as fellow humans with rights and opinions which are worth paying 
attention to. They recognize ‘demand obligation’ where the privileged have an 
obligation to listen and give to the demands of those being helped or gifted. This 
requires the humanization of those receiving, and the recognition that they belong 
in the community. Thus we cannot say because an organization may fit in with 
neoliberal ideology it necessarily serves that ideology coherently. 
 
Celebrity may even play a role in the escape from neoliberalism within 
neoliberalism. Successful ‘helping’ organizations, in particular those who are 
helping people who are classified as ‘different’, may need to cultivate an 
‘artificial’ empathy and humanitarian concern. They may need to build a 
following by allowing some givers to make attempts at gaining status or 
legitimacy through visibly helping, and hence becoming exemplars of help. In the 
information society, living well-known exemplars may be able to make direct 
appeals to their audience and establish ‘virtual’ relationships which extend the 
possibilities of personal contact, empathy and discussion. However, as such 
processes are rarely coherent, these exemplars, and ‘gifting properly’ may then 
become foci of competitive exchange or gift denigration (‘your gifts are not good 
enough, not as good as ones “we” might make’), in a political contest for power, 
which can further distract from offering actual help. 
 
Celebrities play on our sense of relationship with them, but we don’t have a 
relationship with them, neither do most of us have a relationship with those people 
we might be required to help. So the celebrity in going to the field and having 
experiences provides a possible transitional object, a fiction which allows the 
formation of an apparent connection to people not just to facts. By engaging with 
unspeakable events, celebrities can set up being generous and giving help to 
outsiders (often radically different outsiders), as an exemplar of modelable 
behaviour, even if the unspeakability is too soon resolved. People may want to be 
like them and help (or donate) without being personally involved themselves, thus 
generating impersonal welfare, which helps free the helped of indebtedness and 
promotes the ability to demand obligation from the givers. 
 
As untrained people these celebrities may offer escape from the assurance of 
neoliberalism, celebrity capitalists or bourgeois revolutionaries, through some 
suspension of articulateness and foreclosure of certainties, as we shall see when 
Angelina Jolie displays awkwardness around her obligation to others, her 
privilege and the help she gives, or can give. What Jolie establishes, deliberately 
or otherwise, is a sense of relationship between viewers and helped, based in 
difference and incomprehension. This messy classificatory relationship, however 
inadequate or fictional, may be better than none. It allows and cultivates empathy, 





In 2006 Angelina Jolie gave an interview about her experiences with refugees, 
which is almost a locus classicus for critics of celebrity philanthropy (Cooper 
2006; see Nickel 2012). 
 
It is a long interview, and I want to focus on her lacunae and stumblings; the 
points in which ease of language use breaks down, without seeing these as 
irrelevant. They are the moments we might hear something being built, or build 
something ourselves. She is being interviewed on CNN by Anderson Cooper, who 
has also visited refugees. Cooper starts awkwardly. 
 
COOPER: At a certain point, it’s – some people need to block it out. I 
mean, how do you – you go repeatedly and you see this repeatedly. 
And that – I mean, takes a toll. How do you get to a place where you 
can function in that environment? 
 
JOLIE: It does, but, I mean – and you know this – it’s that you get – I 
am so inspired by these people. And they are the greatest strength. 
 
So, it’s not – you have that memory. You have that moment – I have 
had it – where, even just today, I was, you know, breast-feeding, and 
tired, and thinking, God, I really don’t know how I’m going to get 
myself together to be thinking for this interview. 
 
But you think, Jesus, the things these people go through. I owe it to all 
of them to get myself together, to stop whining about being tired, and 
get there and get focused, and, because God, it’s the least I can do, 
with what they live with and what they can – you know, they pull 
themselves out of the most horrible despair. And they’re able to smile 
and get on with it and survive. And, so, you don’t – it’s that same 
thing. You don’t – you don’t think, poor me, what I have seen. You 
just think, like, Jesus, thank God I – I’m not experiencing it […]. 
 
And it was kind of just this area of people who had been – who had 
had their limbs cut off from the violence. And it was an amputee 
camp. And it was probably to this day the worst camp I have ever 
seen. 
 
And I knew I was changing as a person. I was learning so much about 
life. And I was – so, in some ways, it was the best moment of my life, 
because it... […] changed me for the better. And I was never going to 
be never going to be – going to want for more in my life or be... […] 
 
And then, suddenly, you see these people who are really fighting 
something, who are really surviving, who have so much pain and loss 
and things that you have no idea. (Cooper 2006) 
 
Both Jolie and the interviewer, clearly don’t know what to say. In Cooper’s words 
‘And then you come back, and especially in this world that you live in, it’s got to 
be such a strange – it’s got to be surreal’. Is that not the point here? That there is 
no easy conception of this, of what has been witnessed? That ‘we’, Jolie and most 
of the audience, do not have daily experience of camps of war amputees, or of 
human endurance at the limits, or of war trauma. That we complain and ‘whinge’ 
about tiredness, when other people carry on with suffering and lives we cannot 
imagine realistically. And how dare we express that tiredness? And then, she 
clearly does not want to risk patronizing these people; they get on with life in the 
midst of the inconceivable ‘they’re able to smile and get on with it and survive.’ 
We may also note the intrusions of God at these points as an expressive marker, as 
conception, expression and identification break down, but are maintained. Jolie, 
despite her later claims to youthful troubles, has no pain to share with them 
equally; nothing to share other than through classifying herself as human and 
opening empathy. But how do we as viewers/readers empathize in such a 
situation? Again how dare we? How does anyone not make the attempt 
incoherently, without breakage of smooth talk? The breaks allow something to 
happen. This is not all foreclosed in neat categories; the audience has to 
participate to make the broken speech meaningful. By listening and making it out, 
if attentive, they become involved. 
 
Jolie sketches how she got into this, through reading a book from the UN: 
And it said almost 20 million people are displaced. And it showed 
pictures of Rwanda and pictures of all these – and I was kind of – and 
I was just shocked. 
 
I thought, how is that possible, that I have known nothing about this, 
and I’m 20-something years old, and there are this many people 
displaced in the world? 
 
So, I knew it was something that had to be discussed, and wasn’t 
being discussed. (Cooper 2006) 
 
Her ignorance excuses the audience’s ignorance, but she knows something ‘must’ 
be done and points to the lack of discourse, the silence; the lack of action. 
Analysts of celebrity philanthropy, and even the aid workers, journalists or 
politicians, have not crashed through this silence which is perhaps a cultivated 
protective shield to shelter us from the storm of suffering we know is present and 
to allow us to break empathy. Indeed, over the last fifteen years in Australia aid-
workers, advocates and journalists have not crashed through the political 
cultivation of self-righteousness about refugees, as self-righteousness is a defence 
against the suffering which is so much easier to speak (McKenzie and Hasmath 
2013; Toohey 2014). Hatred is directed against an imagined and resolved other 
who are made meaningful in that hatred. Empathy, in these circumstances of 
distance, is indirect and largely gained through relating to the reactions of 
exemplary others who have made an empathetic leap into difference. 
 
Cooper (2006) attempts the classifications of empathy, making commonality: 
‘But, in fact, they – I mean, they are everyone. We all could be refugees at one 
point or another in our lives.’ But this is threatening too. Cooper discusses his own 
feelings after being in Somalia: 
COOPER: And then I felt like I was going through phases, the more 
wars I would go to, of anger, and then confusion... 
JOLIE: Yes. 
COOPER: ... and then outrage, and then sort of resignation, then sort 
of an open feeling that allows me to continue doing it. But do... 
JOLIE: Yes. 
COOPER: Do you go through those phases? 
JOLIE: I did. Yes. I don’t know which phase I’m in now. (Cooper 
2006) 
 
Again we are faced with incoherence, confusion and feeling. Hopefully the 
audience could be building a feeling of some of this complexity as well; some of 
this anguish, which cannot be compared with the anguish of the suffering, but is a 
reaching towards it, and the impossibility and possibility of help. It exemplifies 
the confusion: we know and we don’t really know. We don’t know how to react 
when it is so big. We might oscillate between concern and retreat, outrage and 
resignation. We don’t know which phase we are in now. Jolie says how she felt 
she could save the world, but ‘And then I was – and then I did feel helpless and 
just angry’ (Cooper 2006). Just as we can; and realistically too. What do we do? 
There is very little that is inflated or over-optimistic here; resigned but 
exemplifying not giving up, still striving, not stopping at the point of ‘what do we 
do?’ 
 
Cooper and Jolie are not certain, this we can see and perhaps feel ourselves. They 
talk about legislation in Washington, how the bill was passed, and yet it was not 
funded, so it meant nothing. This too may tell the audience something about 
politics and the ways that ‘help’ actually works in neoliberal capitalism. It might 
provoke some action whether protest or kindness. There is no reward being 
offered here for empathy, except feeling the enormity along with Jolie and 
Cooper, building an empathy with otherness, recognizing both that otherness and 
the humanity, and coming to possibly think about the unthinkable, unfeelable and 
unactable rather than stay avoiding it. 
 
The conversation moves to the then situation in Dafur. Jolie says: 
I hear people talking about Darfur on the news now. And they’re 
talking about, what are we going to do? And they’re starting to discuss 
solutions. And you’re starting – the solutions that you heard field 
officers begging to be addressed three years ago, you know? 
 
And you just, God, feel like, you know, how many times are we going 
to let these things go on this long? Or when are we going to finally be 
united internationally to be able to handle these things immediately 
and... (Cooper 2006) 
 
So it is not her that provides the solutions, but those people on the ground who 
have been ignored. Again we are dealing with horror and silence. Political silence, 
the silence originating in power, and some sign of indignation at this state of 
affairs, perhaps felt in the audience too as we react along with the two of them. 
 
The interview continues, but we shall stop here, in the hope that something has 
been intimated of the constructive force of staying with this incoherence. 
Complexity of reaction, expression and a sense of being overwhelmed (all real) 
are being built up as the interviewer and the interviewee grapple with fundamental 
issues, without (yet) foreclosing into simple solutions or too complex solutions. 
Hopefully the audience is lured into feeling empathy and the desire to help as 
well, despite the complexity, and then take some action – neither Cooper nor Jolie 
can compel. The incoherence and gaps, allow the audience to do its own 
sensemaking, or make its own empathy, and not just accept or reject the meanings 
being made for it by analysts. 
 
Patricia Nickel in her article Philanthromentality (2012: 165) hacks into the 
interview, first pointing to incongruities in Cooper’s remark about using ‘the very 
picture of Hollywood glamour’ to talk about refugees. This ignores the point that 
we, as audience, may not expect film celebrities to be concerned, real, or anything 
other than trivial. This could be an incoherence which acts to bridge our lack of 
concern: if she can feel and act, then why not me? It is a move which might draw 
people in. Nickel (2012: 174) criticizes Jolie for focusing on herself and the ‘best 
moment’ in her life. She claims this manifests what development theorist Ilan 
Kapoor calls ‘“narcissistic samaritanism”… an ‘“act of self-glorification and 
gratification”’ (Nickel 2012: 174), perhaps missing again the reasons and 
hesitations around that moment of shock, empathy and opening, which takes Jolie 
out of her established life, however temporarily, and perhaps allows us to go with 
her, if only imaginaly. Can many people be pure and act without any self-interest 
or any forced compulsion? 
 
Nickel (2012: 175, 179) also argues that the interview justifies Jolie’s wealth and 
privilege; while that is there that is not the whole story. The interview witnesses 
rather than justifies. The wealth allows the travel and direct involvement. We 
know she could be wealthy and do nothing and remain silent; that is not 
impossible. But it also allows the audience to be involved without feeling they 
have to rush to Dafur themselves, as they don’t share that wealth, and they 
probably would not be welcome. They don’t have to give everything they own; it 
opens them to do what they can, to the extent they can. 
 
Nickel (2012: 175) also berates the attempt not to patronize the helped; ‘those 
who suffer are celebrated by Jolie, as they were by Carnegie… for their 
willingness to help themselves, to “smile and get on with it and survive”, their 
toughness, vibrancy and readiness to live’. Does this criticism imply that the only 
people who deserve help are those who are crushed and unable to live, who are 
completely and pleasingly abject? Presumably not. The celebrity is caught, they 
are either said to show no respect or it is said that the respect shown is belittling, 
without the critic ever considering the difficulty of showing respect or 
comprehension across cultures, or the differences in sophistication between 
celebrity analyses. Jolie says of people in the Congo: ‘All the people, and they’re 
so different. And they’re passionate. And they’re tough. And they’re vibrant. And 
ready to live’ (Cooper 2006). The idea that people can be strong and still need 
help, contradicts common American ideas of the worthless or whining poor (as 
seen in Carnegie). It helps build empathy in its prime audience; it may help build 
respect. 
 
Jolie is also accused of not opposing the regime. It is true she is not a 
revolutionary, but she is also not without criticism of political process, the 
ignoring of aid workers, or the silence in the media and general discussion. Is it 
better not to point out as Cooper (2006) does that ‘When the donations don’t get 
there, the food aid gets cut’, in the hope that we can agitate for donations not to be 
cut while waiting for the revolution to occur? Jolie, herself, has been politically 
active, not only in promoting the bill mentioned earlier, but focusing on 
‘unaccompanied minors’ who arrive in the U.S. and ‘basically find themselves in 
the legal system without representation’. This is a political situation, as was the 
charity of compulsion ‘solution’, of locking them up, that she was opposing. Is the 
implication that it might be better to do nothing than to protest as Jolie does? Jolie 
is also blamed for choosing ‘whose suffering she will observe and draw attention 
to as an aesthetic source of emotion and satisfaction in her own life’ (Nickel 2012: 
175), as if there was not always a choice of who was to be heard or helped, and as 
if such deciding did not affect our lives. At least some are being heard, and some 
involvement might begin. While Jolie may not be held account by elections, she is 
subject to criticism by media, the Right, the Left and academics. Her failings are 
not hidden; they are more public than those of most organizations. 
 
Such criticism of celebrity encounters with suffering and pain in the world ignores 
the possibility that such encounters are difficult, or that the celebrity could both be 
disturbed (or overwhelmed) by what they see, and possibly transformed by it (in 
wanting to help somehow), and this might cause them problems in maintaining 
their position or life. Is it the case that Jolie’s life is more comfortable because of 
her actions? Some celebrities may be playing games for publicity; they may also 
be genuinely torn by experiential comparisons between their wealth and fortune, 
and the poverty of others. A kinder approach may lead us to notice Jolie’s 
incoherence as a real response centred on her inability to phrase what she feels, 
her sense of obligation, the inadequacy of what she can do without wanting to put 
people down, and the sense that she might want people (including the helped) to 
participate, rather than have her tell them what to do. Those attentive to her 
incoherence may also empathize with her, and through her with the people she has 
seen, and may move to act. Nickel’s approach, although making many telling 
points, removes complexity through a rush to condemn. Even when Nickel (2012) 
presents transcripts of the interview, she does not touch on what was not sayable; 
the incoherence is ignored, the pauses, the self-questionings are all downplayed, 
so as to get to the fact that we were talking about Jolie rather than the people of 
Sierra Leone – as if Jolie could talk as a person of Sierra Leone, or as if the 
capitalist media would give such a person a lengthy interview. Again this is not 
saying that some celebrities, or others, may not avoid the pain of incoherence and 
rush into quick solutions and quick condemnations. It is saying the incoherence is 





This paper has argued that more emphasis on the paradoxical and incoherent 
nature of help in general, and celebrity philanthropy in particular, would be useful 
to understanding how attempts to help work in practice. Philanthropy and help are 
always going to be foci of dispute. They attempt to build both order and help. 
Either they aim at changing things, assuming they understand the situation 
perfectly and know exactly what to do, and thus produce unexpected results which 
may or may not benefit those being helped; or they work towards improving order 
in which case they can be said to help maintain the conditions which produce the 
need for help, unless again unforseen effects intrude, which is not improbable as 
the brief history given earlier implies. 
 
Modes of help are often not either entirely good or bad, but both simultaneously. 
They can be both noble and self-undermining, or complex and awkward. 
Recognizing the awkwardness could clearly allow us to acknowledge the 
difficulties presented by celebrity philanthropists as well as recognize the possible 
openings they might engender, and the need we might have for them. 
 
The mess of Angelina Jolie’s interviews shows a real response to the immensity 
and inconceivability of the problems, as do her flounderings and relations back to 
herself, in her search for meaning (Cooper 2006). The pauses presented by 
incoherence might even allow us to think, and to imagine a relation between 
people and experience, or generate some kind of bond felt in us which respects the 
incompatibilities and inconceivabilities between people. This could be deeply 
necessary given that most of us do not have a ‘real’ or experiential relation to the 
problems of the peoples being discussed, or even to the presence of those 
problems. Such incoherence before the immensity of disorder and hardship, 
perhaps allows the fiction of relationship, empathy and understanding to be seen 
as complex, or fraught, rather than being taken as real and understood. Trying to 
build coherence and certainty in this disorder might lead even more to overriding 
local conditions with oppressive goodness and the demands of charity of 
compulsion. 
 
The incoherence and the contradictions laid bare by Jolie point to possibilities of 
complex relationship and gifting without expecting obligation, and should not be 
ignored. They could mark the paradoxes and contradictions of help, and perhaps 
of empathy, and lead us into a space of contemplation, action and dialogue, with 
the knowledge of inadequacy before us, and not removed by compulsive certainty. 
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